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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and § 78-2-2, Utah 
Code Ann., as an appeal from a Final Order and Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the claims of fraud, invasion of privacy 
and conspiracy? The standard for review is found in Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967). In order to grant a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court must find 
that there was an absence of any substantial evidence to support 
the verdict. All testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing 
therefrom supporting the non-moving party must be accepted as true 
and all conflicts and all evidence which tend to disprove the non-
moving party's case must be disregarded. An appellate court must 
view the record in a light most favorable to the party against whom 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted. 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding punitive damages as 
part of its judgment notwithstanding the verdict, where the trial 
court made no findings to justify the award of punitive damages, 
no evidence was offered by the plaintiff to show the financial 
worth of defendant GAB and no evidence to show a likelihood that 
defendant GAB's alleged bad conduct would continue. The standard 
of review is found in Koer v. Mayfair Markets, Id. Bundy v. 
Century Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984), held that 
the relative wealth of the defendant, the nature of alleged mis-
conduct and the probability of future recurrences and misconduct 
should be considered in determining punitive damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The plaintiff, Jackie Turner (hereinafter "Turner"), sued 
Inteltech, its president and two employees (hereinafter 
"Inteltech") for fraud and invasion of privacy. Turner also sued 
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. ("GAB"), the appellant here for 
conspiracy to commit either fraud or invasion of privacy. These 
alleged wrongs occurred during investigation of a worker's 
compensation claim. 
Plaintiff's husband was allegedly injured during the course 
of his employment. He filed a claim with his employer's worker's 
compensation insurance carrier and GAB was retained by the 
insurance company to adjust Mr. Turner's claim. GAB hired 
Inteltech to investigate Mr. Turner's activities. An 
administrative law judge for the Industrial Commission denied 
further benefits to Mr. Turner, based in part on testimony from an 
Inteltech employee. The Turners sued the insurance company, 
Inteltech and GAB for fraud, invasion of privacy and conspiracy 
which allegedly occurred during the Inteltech investigation. 
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B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
[The record is referred to as "R.," the transcript of the 
trial as "T." and the transcript of the hearing on plaintiff's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as "T. of H.ff] 
The Turners1 claims against the insurance company were 
dismissed before trial. (R. 318-320). The Turners1 claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, "RICE," breach of 
contract and bad faith were dismissed against all defendants before 
trial. Mr. Turner dismissed his claims against all defendants 
before trial. (R. 452). Mrs. Turner's claims against Inteltech 
employees Hyer and Dye individually were dismissed during trial on 
the plaintiff's motion (T. 466) and Inteltech's claim against the 
Turners for abuse of process was dismissed by Inteltech during 
trial. (T. 432). 
The case was tried to a jury March 12, 1990 through March 14, 
1990 on Jackie Turner's claims of fraud, invasion of privacy and 
conspiracy. At the close of plaintiff's case, all defendants moved 
for a directed verdict. The motions were denied. At the close of 
defendant's case, the plaintiff moved for directed verdict. The 
court took all Turner's motions under advisement. The court stated 
"[t]he court is going to take these matters under advisement. I 
am going to submit the matters to the jury for their 
determination." (T. 444). 
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The jury was given a special verdict form which asked (1) by 
clear and convincing evidence did the defendant Inteltech commit 
fraud upon the plaintiff, which was answered "no"; (2) by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence did the defendant Inteltech invade the 
privacy of the plaintiff, which was answered "no." (R. 721 and 
722). The verdict stated, "if your answer is "no" to question 1 
and 2, sign the special verdict and return it to the bailiff." 
After the jury verdict was read, counsel for plaintiff asked the 
court for a disposition of the motion for directed verdict which 
the court had under advisement. That portion of the discussion 
between court and counsel was not transcribed. After the jury was 
dismissed, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to clarify the 
court's decision on the motion for directed verdict. (T. 534-
535). March 26, 1990 plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and a new trial. (R. 725) All defendants opposed the 
motion. (R. 757-783) 
May 4, 1990 argument was held on plaintiff's motions. The 
court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and denied the motion for new trial. (R. 813) 
June 21, 1990 the court entered its Order and Judgment grant-
ing the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for fraud, 
invasion of privacy and conspiracy and awarding damages as follows: 
Out of pocket damages $ 20.00 
General damages $5,000.00 
Punitive damages $3,000.00 
TOTAL $8,020.00 
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The court found that Inteltech and GAB were jointly and 
severally liable to Jackie Turner for the judgment, including 
punitive damages. Later, Turner moved the Court to amend the 
judgment to allow the issue of damages to be submitted to a jury. 
(R. 930). August 17, 1990 the Court denied the plaintiff's motion. 
The Courtfs decision granting the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is transcribed. In granting the 
motion, the Court stated: ". . . I am of the opinion that no 
reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence which was 
presented to them . . . . And it was highly offensive to this 
court for the defendants to do what they did to Jackie Turner." 
(T. of H. 20). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In September 1986, GAB contracted with Inteltech to 
investigate Mr. Turner. (T. 133, 136, 215, 216, 233). 
2. Ronnie Hyer, an employee of Inteltech, visited with the 
Turr.v rs for a total of two hours and eight minutes. He spent one 
he. and seventeen minutes when Mr. and Mrs. Turner were home 
together and a total of 51 minutes with Mrs. Turner alone. (T. 
175) 
3. Mr. Hyer never entered the Turner home without being 
invited to do so. (T. 161) 
-5-
4. The purpose of visiting the Turnerf.s home was to see if 
the activity of Mr. Turner was consistent with what he had been 
telling the insurance company. (T. 163) 
5. Mrs. Turner's case was GAB's only contact with Intel tech. 
(T. 227) 
6. GAB was interested in Mr. Turner's activities, but had 
no interest in Jackie Turner or the residence. (T. 231, 233, 234) 
7. GAB did not direct or instruct Inteltech about the manner 
in which to conduct the investigation. (T. 240) 
8. Mrs. Turner testified that Hyer visited her approxi-
mately 10 to 15 times. Hyer testified that between October and 
December 1986 he made four visits to the Turner residence, one 
visit with Mrs. Turner at a neighbor's and one telephone call to 
Mrs. Turner. (T. 263; T. 169-173) 
9. The plaintiff introduced reports from Inteltech showing 
a total of six contacts from October to December. (T. 138) 
10. Mrs. Turner testified that she may have made an appoint-
ment with someone to go on a shopping spree arranged by the 
Inteltech representative. (T. 267) 
11. Mrs. Turner testified that on the day of the shopping 
spree she hired a babysitter for her children and paid H20 bucks 
or something like that . . . It was reasonable." The shopping 
spree was allegedly cancelled. (T. 272) 
12. Mr. Turner testified that the only emotional distress 
which he observed his wife display regarding the Industrial 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
Defendant GAB submits that the jury was correct in finding no 
fraud and no invasion of privacy. Turner did not sustain her 
burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence or 
invasion of privacy by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, 
Turner did not sustain her burden of proving conspiracy by clear 
and convincing evidence. In granting plaintiff's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court did not apply the 
correct standard, did not resolve all reasonable inferences in 
favor of defendant GAB and did not view the record in a light most 
favorable to GAB, as is required. Instead, the trial court 
substituted its own personal prejudices regarding the testimony and 
the evidence. 
POINT II. 
The trial court did not apply the correct standard in award-
ing punitive damages. The court ignored clear evidence that GAB 
had only one contract with Inteltech and further ignored the lack 
of evidence on GAB'S net worth and the likelihood of continued 
misconduct by GAB. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPL'Y THE CORRECT 
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evidence or testimony. The trial court should not. substitute its 
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own impressions for that of the jury. In the case here, the trial 
court failed to view the record in a light most favorable to the 
defendants and made no finding regarding the absence of any 
substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury. A review 
of the evidence demonstrates the trial court's error. 
A. Fraud. 
There are nine elements in fraud. (R. 694) The element at 
issue here is the requirement that the plaintiff suffer injury and 
damage as a result of the fraud. Each element of fraud must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
In weighing testimony and evidence regarding the element of 
damage or injury, a jury is guided by all of the instructions given 
by the court. For example, Instruction No. 3 (R. 674) instructed 
the jury that it may consider a witness's deportment, the 
reasonableness of his statements, his apparent frankness and 
candor, or the want of it, and his capacity to remember. 
Instruction No. 5 (R. 676) advised the jury that if any witness 
has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, the jury 
may disregard the entire testimony of such witness. Instruction 
No. 10 (R. 681) instructed the jury that if it was within the power 
of a party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than 
that which was offered on a material point, the jury may view with 
distrust any weaker or less satisfactory evidence actually offered. 
Mrs. Turner's testimony was both vague and false. She 
recalled ten to fifteen visits by the Inteltech representative; 
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temporary labor for $6.00 an hour. Mrs. Turner did not provide any 
testimony or evidence regarding what work she might have done 
during the fifty-one minutes she spent alone with the Inteltech 
representative. On one occasion she had been sleeping and during 
the other visit there was no evidence that she was on her way to 
work. Even the trial court found this testimony of damages 
unimpressive. 
Generally, Mrs. Turner had difficulty remembering what she 
could have been doing during the visits by Inteltech and had no 
records to refresh her memory: 
Question: And do you recall for those visits what work 
you would have been doing during the visit? 
Answer: I can't at this moment recall. 
Question: Well, is there a record or some records that 
you could review? (T. 297). 
Question: . . . It's also true that you don't remember 
specifically what you would have been doing during Mr. 
Hyer's visits? 
Answer: Not without looking at my books. 
Question: And you don't have those with you? 
Answer: Not today. 
Question: And are you going to get them at noon? 
Answer: I don't think that would be possible. 
Question: So in other words, you don't have your 
records? 
Answer: Not today. (T. 299). 
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babys111ei: for 1 ier ch I ] dren and pa:i :I 11 ie s111er f M 11*Mi t>r 
s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h a t " f o r w a t c l i i n . ) h . T f:h i 1 d r e n , M r s . V rnf-'i 
f i i f i J i f T t» •• I i 1 i ml il III ill il In hu[ ip i IH | " | H P I ' wan i .nit t I h i] iiiiiiiiJI i) t I 
she stiJJ pcucll I hfj babysitter Ui watrli tier children for ri few 
hours. Mrs. Turner's testi mony i s as fol 1 ows: 
Ai ISW ei: i I le [ Ii iteltech representative Hyer ] invited me 
to take part in a shopping spree with my husband , and he 
explained tc me what tl tat would be. 
1 agreed to that. And. I th I nk we. made an appointment tc ) 
do that. 
Question: Did y ou ever do that? Did you ever gc c i I 1: I :IJ= • 
shopping spree? 
Answer i No, we did not The day of tl :ie shopping spree 
that I had set aside for it and taken my eh 11 dren to the 
s i 1 1 e • :i "
 t h e c a 1 ] e d a n d c a n c e 11 e d (T 2 6 7 ) 
Answer I \ i : .d t .1 len the day whei :i he cance] 1• 
shopping spree, I had cancelled my entire business day 
t h a t day plus h I r e d a b a b y s i 11 e i: f o r my c h i 1 dren And 
I s t :t Il ] h a d t o p a y h e r , 
Q u e s t i o n i H o ; nit t i :::: I I :::! :i cl • 
r emember ' : ' 
Answer : I t h i n k i t v as ] i ke 20 bucks o r soineU'ii ny J i lu 
t h a t f o r a 1 ] t h r e e k1ds , 11 was r e a s o n a b l e . (T, 2 7 2 ) . 
M r s . T u r n e r '" s t e s t i m o i :t y :::1 :i ::l i I o t 3 < e i i a p p r o a c h p i n i r 11 j l-111II"l 
t i a l damages by cl e a r ai id coi I i/i nci i lg e v i d e n c e I ler niemor y K ^ > 
u n c e r 1: a I n a n d e q u I v o c a 1 , T 1 I e m e a s u i: e c f d a in a g e s w a s n o m I n a I  I I 
I s v, e .: ] e s t at>] I s i led i :i : "I nil: E J i t l lat a j : Jl a i i I Il::i f f mi i s t I :ta « € > h IIJIMI;- I .-JIII I i n I 
d a m a g e b e f o r e a n a c t, i o n £ o r t r a u d c a n a r i s e ; n o m i n a 1 d a in a g e s a r e 
- 1 3 -
not awarded for fraud. Prosser, Prosser On Torts, Ch. 18, § 110; 
Dillworth v. Lauritsen, 424 P.2d 136 (Utah 1967), Ellis v. 
Crockett, 451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 1969). 
Mrs. Turner's testimony regarding damages was defective in 
other ways,, First, she suffered no detriment at all. She obtained 
the services of a babysitter and paid the babysitter $20.00. Mrs. 
Turner received the benefit of free time with someone watching her 
children even though the alleged "shopping spree" did not occur. 
Second, Mrs. Turner's evidence of the payment was unpersuasive. 
She did not produce a cancelled check or receipt, nor did she 
produce testimony from the babysitter. Mrs. Turner could not 
recall the date on which the alleged shopping spree was scheduled, 
nor the date it was allegedly cancelled. 
Third, there can be no claim for fraud if the damages caused 
could have been mitigated or avoided. Condor v. Williams & 
Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987). If, in fact, a 
shopping spree had been scheduled and cancelled, plaintiff had the 
obligation to mitigate her damages by cancelling the babysitter or 
using the time profitably. 
The trial court, in granting the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was of the opinion "that $20.00 was 
testified to. That there was a lot of argument on it but there 
was no strong cross-examination that money was never spent by her." 
(T. of H. 21). Defendant GAB submits that in granting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the claim of fraud, the court 
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entirely disregarded the inconsistent, vague and unpersuasive 
testimony presented by Mrs. Turner. The court blatantly ignored 
its own instruction requiring the elements of fraud to be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence. The fact that the "20 bucks" was 
testified to without strong cross examination does not establish 
substantial damages by clear and convincing evidence. Stated 
simply, the court was grasping at straws to justify its pre-
conceived notion of a desired outcome. If the trial court's 
attitude regarding damages in fraud cases were the law in Utah, 
every broken promise resulting in the expenditure of nominal 
amounts would be actionable. Social engagements which are 
cancelled after purchase of tickets for an event or food would be 
actionable under the trial courtfs theory. The trial court deci-
sion trivializes damages in fraud cases and should be summarily 
rejected by this court. 
B. Invasion of Privacy. 
Invasion of privacy may be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence. It requires that: 
(1) the defendants intentionally intruded upon the 
solitude or seclusion of the plaintiff or her private 
affairs or concerns; and 
(2) the intrusion was substantial and would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement of Torts 
(2nd); (R. 690). 
Mrs. Turner failed to prove invasion of privacy by a 
preponderance of the evidence as the jury verdict reflects. 
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However, even if the trial court believed that the claim had been 
established, it was nevertheless improper to grant judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. The court was required to find an 
absence of any substantial evidence in support of the verdict and 
view all evidence in a light most favorable to the defendants, as 
a matter of law, and this it failed to do. 
The first element of invasion of privacy requires an inten-
tional intrusion upon solitude, seclusion or private affairs. 
Webster's dictionary defines "intrude" as thrusting oneself without 
invitation, permission, or welcome or to enter by force. The 
testimony was undisputed that the Inteltech representative entered 
the Turner residence only when he was invited and that his visits 
were brief and at appropriate times. There was no filming of the 
inside of the home nor entry into private areas of the home such 
as bathrooms or bedrooms. The testimony was undisputed, even by 
Mrs. Turner, that the Inteltech representative was always 
courteous, polite and friendly. Finally, Mrs. Turner admitted that 
she never asked the Inteltech representative to leave or to return 
at a different time when he allegedly arrived inopportunely. 
There was no testimony that the Inteltech representative 
inquired into private or personal matters such as sexual intimacy 
or emotional or physical conflict between Mr. and Mrs. Turner. 
The visits themselves produced no embarrassment or discomfort for 
Mrs. Turner at the time. Consequently, there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find that no "intrusion" occurred. Of 
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more importance, under the facts, it was impossible for the trial 
court to find an absence of any substantial evidence in support of 
the jury's decision. 
The second element of invasion of privacy requires that the 
intrusion be substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. This element of invasion of privacy, like negligence cases 
and the standard of the "reasonable man,11 is best suited for 
determination by a jury. • The jury heard all of the evidence 
regarding visits by the Inteltech representative and all of the 
evidence regarding Mrs. Turner's reaction to it. The jury 
represented a "reasonable person" for deciding whether the conduct 
of the Inteltech representative was offensive. The jury concluded 
that it was not. The court felt otherwise. However, the court's 
personal biases and beliefs are not the benchmark for granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendant GAB submits that 
the trial court abused its discretion and abrogated the jury's 
function by substituting its own reaction to the testimony for the 
reasoned decision of eight men and women. 
The cases referred to by counsel for Mrs. Turner in the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict involved decisions by a 
trial court before a trial and basically concluded that the claim 
for invasion of privacy should be submitted to a jury to decide 
whether an intrusion occurred and whether it was highly offensive 
to a reasonable person. In this case, the jury found that the 
claim had not been proved and then the trial court, ignoring the 
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facts and the law, substituted its own subjective views for that 
of the jury. 
C• Conspiracy. 
nTo prove a civil conspiracy, [a] plaintiff must show the 
following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) 
an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the 
object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, 
and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987). A plaintiff must 
prove all of these elements by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
at 790. 
The form of the special verdict (which was not excepted to by 
plaintiff's counsel) indicates that the fourth element of 
conspiracy, i.e. an unlawful or overt act or acts, was fraud and/or 
invasion of privacy. The jury was instructed that each element had 
to be proved by clear and convincing evidence in order to find GAB 
liable for conspiracy. Likewise, the plaintiff had the burden of 
proving damages as a proximate result of the unlawful and/or overt 
acts by clear and convincing evidence. The arguments presented 
above on fraud and invasion of privacy obtain directly to the 
fourth and fifth elements of conspiracy. Particularly, the 
arguments regarding invasion of privacy are relevant since the 
plaintiff was required to prove that claim by clear and convincing 
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evidence, not preponderance of evidence, for purposes of the 
conspiracy claim. 
Moreover, according to Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P. 2d 
785 (Utah App. 1987) the meeting of minds on the object or course 
of action must relate to the unlawful or overt act. See also 
Shadid v. Monsour, 746 P.2d 685 (Okl. App. 1987) and Wyatt v. Union 
Mortgage Company, 598 P.2d 45 (Calif. 1979). In this case, it was 
acknowledged that GABfs only objective and only agreement with 
Inteltech was the investigation of Mr. Turner. The plaintiff 
acknowledged that investigation of Mr. Turner was appropriate and 
lawful. Thus, the third element of conspiracy was not proved. 
Thus, we find that there is no clear and convincing 
evidence that the party1s evil object was to defraud 
Pagan. . . . there is no direct evidence in the record 
of a meeting of the parties1 minds with respect to 
defrauding Pagan of his property . . . but the other 
facts do not necessarily or even reasonably lead to the 
inference that the parties were doing anything but 
engaging in a normal real estate transaction. Israel 
Pagan Estates v. Cannon. 
Id. 
Defendant submits that the plaintiff completely failed to 
prove conspiracy by clear and convincing evidence. By the plain-
tiff's own admission, the object of the agreement between GAB and 
Inteltech was the investigation of Mr. Turner, not Mrs. Turner. 
Further, the jury found that there was no unlawful or overt act: 
fraud or invasion of privacy. Finally, the proof of damages which 
was defective in the fraud claim was equally deficient in the 
conspiracy claim. 
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The court's reasoning and justification in finding the 
existence of conspiracy are even more insubstantial than that 
regarding fraud and invasion of privacy. The court stated: 
And that I am also of the opinion - and I don't know that 
this is really before me at this time - the elements of 
conspiracy were proven as far as, I guess, Inteltech and 
GAB. (T. of H. 21-22) 
The trial court failed to apply the proper standard in 
granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on the claim of conspiracy. The trial court did not 
articulate any grounds for concluding there was an absence of any 
substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. The court did 
not articulate in any fashion how, viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to defendants, conspiracy had been proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. The trial court abused its discretion and 
ignored the legal standard for granting a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and the decision must be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AGAINST GAB. 
The trial court, after granting judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, awarded special damages of $20.00, general damages of 
$5,000.00 and punitive damages of $3,000.00. The award of punitive 
damages was improper. Johnson v. Rogers, 764 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), 
enunciates the standard for awarding punitive damages: 
. . . they [punitive damages] may be imposed for conduct 
that is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing 
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and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights 
of others. 
In Bundv v. Century Equipment Company, 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1984) the court identified factors which should be considered in 
determining the amount of punitive damages: 
. . . the relative wealth of the defendant, the nature 
of his alleged misconduct, the facts and circumstances 
surrounding such misconduct, the effect thereof upon the 
lives of the plaintiff and others, the probability of 
future recurrence of the misconduct, the relationship 
between the parties, and the amount of actual damages 
awarded. 
See also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). The 
jury received no evidence of any of the factors enumerated in 
Bundv. The plaintiff admitted that no evidence was presented of 
the relative wealth or financial condition of GAB and no evidence 
was presented regarding the probability of future recurrence of 
the alleged misconduct. Furthermore, the court made no finding 
that the acts of GAB were willful and malicious or manifested a 
knowing and reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. 
The evidence received by the jury was that GAB had never 
contracted with Inteltech before the Turner investigation and had 
no other contracts with Inteltech. The evidence also established 
that GABfs only purpose in hiring Inteltech was to gain informa-
tion about Mr. Turner as it related to his claim for worker's 
compensation. The court's decision regarding liability and damages 
stated; 
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But I am going to grant to the plaintiff out-of-pocket 
damages of $20.00, general damages of $5,000.00, punitive 
damages of $3,000.00 . . . 
I am convinced that Inteltech was the agent - - or was 
it the other way around? Yeah. Inteltech was the agent 
of GAB and GAB indicated that they knew what Inteltech 
was doing and how they were conducting their business. 
That's my best recollection. As I said at the outset, 
some of my memory is a little hazy on the facts. My best 
recollection is that GAB's individuals testified they 
knew how they were conducting [sic] and what they were 
doing. (T. of H. 22 and 26) 
The trial court erred in awarding punitive damages against 
GAB. The trial court ignored the standard of Johnson v. Rogers, 
supra, and other decisions from this court regarding punitive 
damages. There was no evidence to support the court's decision 
and, in fact, the only evidence presented at trial was contrary to 
the court's conclusion. The court's award of punitive damages must 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The court did not apply the correct standard in granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Evidence regarding detri-
ment or injury in the fraud claim was unpersuasive, speculative 
and insubstantial. It did not prove substantial damages by clear 
and convincing evidence. Invasion of privacy was not proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence as to Inteltech or by clear and 
convincing evidence as required for the conspiracy claim against 
GAB. The plaintiff failed to prove several elements of conspir-
acy by clear and convincing evidence; the court's decision 
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regarding conspiracy does not even approach a reasonable finding. 
The court ignored the law regarding the standard for punitive 
damages and committed error in awarding punitive damages against 
GAB, The trial court's order and judgment should be reversed. 
Judgment should be entered in accordance with the jury verdict, 
finding no cause of action against the defendants. Defendant GAB 
should be awarded costs and attorney's fees for perfecting this 
appeal. 
DATED th is ^L 
K> 
day of March, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Craig L/Barlow 
Attorneys/for Defendant GAB 
CLB270 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight 
of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a 
right to take into consideration their bias, their interest in 
the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof 
to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the wit-
nesses1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of 
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, 
and their capacity to remember. You should consider these matters 
together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you 
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the 
witnesses' statement. 
Tab 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified 
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the en-
tire testimony of such witness, except as he may have been 
corroborated by other credible evidence, 
Tab 3 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
If you should find that it was within the power of a 
party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than 
that which was offered on a material point, you may view with 
distrust any weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually 
offered by him on that point, unless such failure is 
satisfactorily explained. 
35\c1b2\12377.01<Ainstr10.add 
Tab 4 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
1. By clear and convincing evidence, did the defendant 
Inteltech commit fraud upon the plaintiff, Jackie Turner, as 
that cause of action has been explained in these 
instructions? 
ANSWER: NO. 
2. By a preponderance of the evidence, did the defendant 
Inteltech invade the privacy of the plaintiff Jackie Turner 
as that cause of action has been explained in these 
instructions? 
ANSWER: NO. 
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GLEN A. COOK - 3710 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACKIE TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, ] 
INC., a Delaware corporation; 1 
DENNIS DYE; RONNIE HYER; ; 
OAK NORTON, INTELDEX 
CORPORATION, d/b/a 
Inteltech Services; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING | THE VERDICT 
i Civil No. C87-5401 
i Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict and Motion for A New Trial came before the Court 
for hearing on May 4, 1990. Gordon K. Jensen represented the 
plaintiff. Craig L. Barlow represented the defendant General 
Adjustment Bureau ("GAB"). Robert L. Stevens and Michael L. 
Schwab represented the defendants Inteltech and Oak Norton. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the pleadings on file, the 
arguments of the parties, the stipulations of the parties 
before and during trial, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The judgment entered by this Court on , 
1990 , pursuant to the jury verdict is hereby vacated, and the 
following judgment is hereby entered, notwithstanding the 
verdict of the jury; 
2. The plaintiff James Turner's claims against all 
defendants are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipula-
tion; 
3. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's claims against 
Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in their individual capacities, are 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation; 
4. The defendant Oak Norton's counterclaim against 
James Turner and Jackie Turner is dismissed with prejudice 
pursuant to stipulation; 
5. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's Motion for a New 
Trial is denied; 
6. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted. Judgment is 
entered against Inteltech on Jackie Turner's fraud and invasion 
of privacy claims as follows: 
Out-of-Pocket Damages $ 20.00 
General Damages 5,000.00 
Punitive Damages 3,000 . 00 
TOTAL $ 8,020.00 
2 
7. Judgment is entered against Inteltech and GAB on 
Jackie Turner's conspiracy claim, Inteltech and GAB are 
jointly responsible to Jackie Turner for the amount of this 
Judgment. 
8. Oak Norton is personally liable to Jackie Turner 
for the amount of this Judgment. 
9. The plaintiff is awarded post judgment interest 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, accruing at a rate of 12% 
per annum from the date hereof. 
10. The plaintiff is awarded her costs of court as 
determined pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Tab 6 
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TURNER, JAMES 
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OCCIDENTAL FIRE & CASUALTY IN 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
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HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
4-501 RULING 
PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED 
JUNE 4, 1990 ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, THE COURT HAVING REVIEWED THE FILE AND READ THE 
PLEADINGS RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JUDGMENT ON THE JURY VERDICT IS 
GRANTED 
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT (CONSPIRACY AND NORTON'S PERSONAL LIABILITY) IS GRANTED 
3. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT IS DENIED. 
CC: GLEN COOK 
MICHAEL SCHWAB 
CRAIG BARLOW 
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